La Germania svenduta
Giuseppe Sandro Mela.
2018-08-23.
Un classico errore dei governanti è quello di inseguire un qualcosa di lucroso nell’immediato, ma altamente controproducente del futuro. Non che i privati siano da meno, la storia economica dimostra una serie impressionante di episodi del genere.
Il problema si potrebbe porre in modo molto accattivante, argomentando sul concetto di futuro.
Chi viva l’immanente nella convinzione che tutto in esso si estingua è incapace per definizione di concepire il concetto stesso di futuro. Ma senza il concetto di futuro sarebbe impossibile nutrire sentimenti di speranza.
In campo politico e militare è la differenza che intercorre tra la tattica e la strategia. Ma sempre la storia insegnerebbe come senza una chiara visione strategica sia impossibile perseguire i propri fini. Quanti invece riescono a ragionare in tali termini mettono in pratica azione dopo azione, magari anche apparentemente scollegate, ma che in realtà altro non sono che tasselli di un puzzle che quando alla fine si evidenzia nella sua pienezza ne rende consolidati i fini perseguiti.
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La Germania degli ultimi decenni ha evidenziato una carenza impressionante di pensiero strategico.
Il più vistoso errore strategico è stato quelle relativo ad una politica familiare al limite del demenziale, che sta portando la Germania all’estinzione della popolazione autoctona per carenza di nascite.
Ma a questo errore si sono associate due tendenze altrettanto perverse.
La prima tendenza è stata quella di delocalizzare la produzione industriale, invece di renderla competitiva in patria. Se in un primo tempo si ha l’impressione di guadagnare, ed anche molto, alla fine si perde il know-how produttivo e le maestranze specializzate. In caso poi di tensioni, mica che si possa andare a riprendersi gli stabilimenti delocalizzati, che resteranno per sempre in territori stranieri, ossia con altre politiche produttive. Non è detto che gli stranieri debbano per forza di cose essere “nemici” ma resta il fatto che gli stabilimenti sono fuori dal controllo politico del paese delocalizzante.
La seconda tendenza è stata quella di vendere, lasciar vendere, in molti casi anche svendere, realtà produttive quasi sempre in buona salute, produttrici spesso di prodotti strategici. In linea generale non ci sarebbe stato nulla di male in tali operazioni, se a queste fossero corrisposte acquisizioni tedesche di realtà produttive straniere, cosa che non è avvenuta.
Non solo. La maggior parte di queste acquisizioni era volta a trasferire nel paese acquirente il know-how produttivo. Ottimo sistema per passare tecnologica ai concorrenti.
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«It’s not particularly logical that, after years of permissiveness toward Chinese investors buying up German industrial jewels, Berlin has decided to ban the acquisition of Leifeld Metal Spinning – a technologically advanced but small firm from the town of Ahlen in North Rhine-Westphalia»
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«Leifeld, a closely held company, makes machines and tools used in the production of extra strong metal parts that are inputs, for example, in the automotive, aerospace and nuclear industries»
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«That may sound important for national security, which was the reason cited when the government made its decision»
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«But Leifeld reported revenue of 28.5 million euros ($33.1 million) in 2014, the last year for which Bloomberg has financial data; the government has allowed much bigger companies playing an important role in strategic industries to be sold to Chinese investors. The most memorable example is Kuka, one of the global robotics leaders, acquired by Chinese appliance maker Midea for 4.5 billion euros in 2016»
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«When those acquisitions took place, Germany looked feckless at times. In recent months, however, the government has been determined to look after national interests a little more like the U.S. does, subjecting potential deals to more scrutiny and getting a state-controlled bank to preempt a Chinese investment in power grid operator 50Hertz, part of Germany’s critical infrastructure.»
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«This massive Chinese investment in Europe – at a cumulative 131.9 billion euros, it caught up last year with European investment in China, according to Rhodium Group – isn’t always a problem»
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«the Chinese government using every opportunity to raise domestic companies’ competitiveness, technology transfers can end up going further than just the acquiring firm, whether public or private.»
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«Last year, Chinese direct investment in the EU approached 30 billion euros, compared with a reverse flow of about 7 billion»
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Bene. La Germania si avvia adesso a chiudere la stalla: peccato che i buoi se la siano già data a gambe.
Ci si domanda lecitamente cosa mai abbiano fatto di male i tedeschi ai loro governanti.
Even if there’s not much logic to the toughness, it should help the EU negotiate a stalled investment deal with China.
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It’s not particularly logical that, after years of permissiveness toward Chinese investors buying up German industrial jewels, Berlin has decided to ban the acquisition of Leifeld Metal Spinning – a technologically advanced but small firm from the town of Ahlen in North Rhine-Westphalia. While it sends a clear signal that the anything-goes era is over, it’s also a worrying consequence of a dearth of clear rules.
Leifeld, a closely held company, makes machines and tools used in the production of extra strong metal parts that are inputs, for example, in the automotive, aerospace and nuclear industries. That may sound important for national security, which was the reason cited when the government made its decision. But Leifeld reported revenue of 28.5 million euros ($33.1 million) in 2014, the last year for which Bloomberg has financial data; the government has allowed much bigger companies playing an important role in strategic industries to be sold to Chinese investors. The most memorable example is Kuka, one of the global robotics leaders, acquired by Chinese appliance maker Midea for 4.5 billion euros in 2016. KraussMaffei, an industrial equipment manufacturer sold to a consortium led by ChemChina for about $1 billion, is another.
When those acquisitions took place, Germany looked feckless at times. In recent months, however, the government has been determined to look after national interests a little more like the U.S. does, subjecting potential deals to more scrutiny and getting a state-controlled bank to preempt a Chinese investment in power grid operator 50Hertz, part of Germany’s critical infrastructure.
This massive Chinese investment in Europe – at a cumulative 131.9 billion euros, it caught up last year with European investment in China, according to Rhodium Group – isn’t always a problem. Automotive giant Zhejiang Geely saved Swedish carmaker Volvo by acquiring it in 2010. There’s no question European firms have benefited from the depth of Chinese investors’ pockets. But China is a country where the state plays an outsize role in the economy. So when state-controlled firms take part in acquisitions (in Germany, for example, they bought into KraussMaffei, energy producer EEW and other large companies), concerns about subsidies and unfair competition can be justified. Besides, with the Chinese government using every opportunity to raise domestic companies’ competitiveness, technology transfers can end up going further than just the acquiring firm, whether public or private.
The biggest concern, however, is reciprocity. Last year, Chinese direct investment in the EU approached 30 billion euros, compared with a reverse flow of about 7 billion. Some of the biggest Chinese acquisitions in Europe deals would have been impossible or at least highly unlikely for European companies in China. According to Rhodium Group, the equivalents of the Kuka and KraussMaffei deals wouldn’t have been allowed.
It’s telling that analysts have a pretty good idea of how China would treat one investment or another, but it’s not easy to figure out what European countries might do in any specific case. Why is the Kuka deal OK, but not the Leifeld deal?
Last year, the German, French and Italian governments asked the European Commission to come up with an EU-wide mechanism for screening foreign investment. By September, the Commission came up with a proposal to assess investments according to their effect on critical infrastructure and technology, the security of important supplies and information and the investors’ government affiliations. Yet the proposal hasn’t become EU law yet because some member countries are hungry for Chinese investment and reluctant to submit to a common review process.
Perhaps that’s for the best. The EU proposal addresses security and competition concerns but not reciprocity ones. That could be justified on idealistic grounds: The EU, after all, is not Communist-run, and restrictions symmetrical to the Chinese ones wouldn’t make sense from the point of view of European values. From a practical point of view, however, any lack of reciprocity creates leverage in trade talks – something the Trump trade wars are making abundantly clear.
Both investors and targets need clarity about what can work and what can’t. The best way to deliver it would be for the EU to sign a bilateral investment treaty with China. Negotiations have been under way since 2013, but there’s no end in sight. In this context, there is perhaps some logic to the Leifeld acquisition ban. Germany has absorbed about a fifth of the total Chinese direct investment in the EU; after the U.K. leaves the bloc, it will be the number one destination for Chinese money within it. If Germany gets tough on acquisitions, it won’t be easy for Chinese firms to find equivalent targets elsewhere. So perhaps it’ll lend some new vigor to investment deal talks, especially as China and the EU find themselves allied in defending free trade from an increasingly protectionist U.S.
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